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Abstract 
I summarize the excitement of my role primarily in the early years of X-ray Astronomy. As a 
“second-generation” X-ray astronomer, I was privileged to participate in the enormous advance 
of the field, both technically and astrophysically, that occurred in the late 1960’s and 1970’s. The 
remainder of my career has concentrated on the design, construction, calibration, operation, and 
scientific maintenance of the “cathedral” that is the Chandra X-Ray Observatory.  I contrast my 
early experiences with the current environment for the design and development of 
instrumentation—especially X-ray optics, which are absolutely essential for the development of 
the discipline. I express my concerns for the future of X-ray astronomy and offer specific 
suggestions that I hope will advance the discipline at a more effective and rapid pace. 
The Columbia Years 
I spent my early post-graduate years from 1969 until the fall of 1977 as part of Robert (Bob) 
Novick’s group at the Columbia Astrophysics Laboratory (CAL), Columbia University in the 
city of New York.  To say that these were exciting and interesting times would be an 
understatement.  For example, a few days after I arrived, I found myself in the entrance hall of 
the Pupin building sitting with T. D. Lee and a number of other faculty members holding long 
discussions with (mostly) student demonstrators that were attempting to take over this physics 
building in protest over Columbia scientists’ participation in a military think tank.  
Even before I accepted the position at CAL, Bob took me to a meeting at the company American 
Science and Engineering (AS&E), in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The discussion centered on 
something called a “Super Explorer” and the “Principal Investigator Group” (acronyms withheld 
by popular request).  At this meeting, I first met several people—especially, Leon Van 
Speybroeck and Harvey Tananbaum—who were to play significant roles in my career. Riccardo 
Giacconi made the most profound impression: He emphasized the importance of imaging for 
advancing X-ray astronomy, an insight he formed within a year after the 1962 sounding-rocket 
experiment that discovered the brightest non-solar source, Scorpius X-1.  It is little wonder he 
eventually (2002)  received the Nobel Prize.  
It puzzles me even to this day that, despite the leaps and bounds made by ever improving angular 
resolution, there are many proponents seeking more photons (larger area) at the price of angular 
resolution. I don’t imply that such experiments haven’t proven and won’t prove fruitful, but 
frankly I feel they pale in comparison to what has been, could be, and should be accomplished.  
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Just after I arrived at the CAL, a rocket that Bob Novick and those already there had put together 
blew up on launch at the White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. The payload featured the 
first X-ray “telescope”, a concentrator, made of dozens and dozens of gold-coated microscope 
slides mounted to approximate a paraboloid.  I mention this because those circumstances taught 
me (and the rest of us) an important lesson that influenced my approach to interacting with 
NASA and especially my approach to Chandra. The reason that the rocket blew up was that the 
second-stage liquid-fuel Aerobee never ignited. The liquid-fuel stage stood on a metallic “milk 
stool” above the solid-rocket Nike booster that started the journey into space.  As the Nike’s 
acceleration built up it passed through the milk stool and entered the Aerobee’s liquid fuel tanks. 
At least the event was spectacular. The firing of the liquid fuel was to have been triggered by 
means of a lanyard connecting the ignition system to the launch tower; but someone forgot to 
connect the lanyard. Of course there were investigations and blame and this was not the 
scientist’s responsibility, but to us the message was clear: We hadn’t paid enough attention to 
everything involved in the entire system. When the rocket failed, ultimately we scientists pay the 
biggest price.  
 
Figure 1. Picture taken in 1970 at Wallops Island, of sounding rocket 17.09, which featured two 
types of X-ray polarimeters. This experiment unambiguously measured the polarization of the 
integrated X-ray emission from the Crab Nebula. From left to right: Robert Novick (CAL 
Director), Gabriel Epstein (my graduate student), myself, Richard Wolff (my office mate), and 
Richard Linke (his graduate student). 
During these early times, there were excellent groups forming at several US institutions: 
Columbia, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), AS&E, California Institute of 
Technology (CIT), Wisconsin, Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), Lawrence Berkeley 
Laboratory (LBL), Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), Lockheed Palo Alto, Stanford, etc.). 
All were more or less adequately funded to develop and demonstrate instrumentation (including 
X-ray optics) capable of obtaining scientific results.  In the early 1970’s, these capabilities were 
demonstrated mainly through sounding-rocket experiments. At Columbia we utilized sounding 
rockets with a passion. With four young Assistant Professors (Paul Van den Bout, Roger Angel, 
Richard Wolff, and myself) supplementing Bob’s fertile imagination and abilities as a hands-on 
experimentalist, we developed spectrometers, concentrators, telescopes, and polarimeters for X-
ray astronomy. We were designing, building, and flying new instruments at a cadence of about 
once per year. Like most of the other groups, we were all (to a greater or lesser degree) 
participating in every experimental aspect for doing the science of X-ray astronomy, not 
necessarily specializing in one arena or another. The competition and rivalry (for the most part 
friendly) was an essential ingredient in developing the field. The best technical approaches often 
resulted from a merging of ideas, techniques, and approaches from different organizations. 
During the 1970’s at CAL, we also began participating in the satellite era—successfully 
proposing, building, testing, and flying both an X-ray spectrometer (solar and stellar) and an X-
ray polarimeter (stellar) on the OSO-8 satellite. Our pioneering efforts to establish the field of X-
ray polarimetry were sadly the precursor to a frustrating future. Based upon early successes, Bob 
led the development of a polarimeter for the first (Russian) Spectrum-X satellite mission, which 
unfortunately was ultimately cancelled. More recently, NASA cancelled a GSFC-led Small 
Explorer Mission dedicated to low-energy X-ray polarimetry.  
Simultaneously, CAL partnered with a number of institutions to develop instrumentation for the 
High-Energy Astronomy Observatory (HEAO) series of satellites. Our team at Columbia had a 
major role in three of the originally four HEAO satellites, including a one-arc minute, 1000-cm
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Kirkpatrick-Baez telescope in collaboration primarily with AS&E/SAO (Bob Novick and Paul 
Gorenstein running the show). This experiment would have performed an all-sky survey on the 
first HEAO mission.  Unfortunately the HEAO program hit a major obstacle, such that I (along 
with the rest of the community) experienced the first of a series of political decisions that seemed 
to relegate science second to presumed expediency. Frankly, the cancellation and resurrection of 
the HEAO program came as quite a shock to this naïve young researcher. Clearly the HEAO 
Program was excellent, with cutting-edge science and technology: Why should it be cancelled?  
Obviously I had a lot to learn about NASA politics. However, the experience was, in its own 
way, invaluable. Long story short, the HEAO program with its 4 satellites was cancelled. The 
new and reduced program resurrected from its ashes sadly did not completely encompass the best 
science. Historians will tell us that the decisions were politically necessary. Perhaps, but one is 
never sure. Can you imagine the progress of X-ray astronomy had the arc-minute-resolution all-
sky survey, which was the first of the original HEAO series, been performed in the 1970’s?  
The Marshall Years 
In 1977 I received an offer from NASA to go to the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC; 
Huntsville, Alabama) to become the Project Scientist for the Advanced X-ray Astrophysics 
Facility (AXAF), eventually renamed the Chandra X-ray Observatory. I still hold this position. 
MSFC, in partnership with Riccardo Giacconi and scientists at the Smithsonian Astrophysical 
Observatory (SAO), had won management of this potential mission in competition with the Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory (JPL)/CIT and with GSFC. The community wanted to avoid many of the 
difficulties encountered in accomplishing the HEAO-2 (Einstein Observatory) mission: A critical 
element was to have Project Science on-site rather than long-distance, as was the case for the 
Einstein Observatory. At the risk of appearing immodest, I am firmly convinced that this 
decision was a major factor in Chandra’s programmatic, technical, and scientific success. The 
second critical element was that the Project-Science function was not to be implemented by a 
single person but rather by a team of scientists at MSFC and at SAO, which brought all the 
Einstein experience to bear on this challenging project. Chandra was to be the mission that, 
amongst many other objectives, would address questions raised by the diffuse glow of X-rays 
also detected during that first sounding-rocket experiment in 1962. To accomplish the task of 
resolving the “diffuse” X-ray background would require an angular resolution of an arcsecond or 
better and an effective area of several hundred square centimeters.  Although no one had ever 
built such an X-ray telescope, the scientific requirements were clear. Moreover, the community 
united to try to hold the line on requirements, placing scientific—not programmatic— 
considerations at the forefront. We were reasonably successful in this, primarily for the 
telescope. (As noted below, this is neither the time nor the place for my unabridged version of 
the Chandra saga.) In 1977, the projected launch of Chandra was 1985. For a number of reasons, 
both technical and programmatic (mostly financial), the projected launch date slipped a year per 
year until 1992. With consistent funding and only minor delays thereafter, the launch occurred in 
1999.  
The technical insights and experience provided by Chandra Project Science (not just me, but also 
Ron Elsner, Allyn Tennant, Brian Ramsey, Steve O’Dell, Marshall Joy, Jeff Kolodziejczak, 
Doug Swartz, and several others who were part of the Project Science Team at MSFC) and by 
SAO scientists and engineers, along with all of our sense of responsibility to the rest of the 
community, served the project in numerous ways. Perhaps the most important was the control of 
requirements, which had no major change over the 22 years between 1977 and the 1999 launch. 
Our ability to accomplish Chandra with such success was founded on the experiences and 
capabilities that we developed in the “early days”. We had built instruments, sometimes making 
last minute repairs while the rocket was mounted in the launch tower; we had participated in 
satellite missions, sometimes going through the agonies of cancellation, etc. In other words, by 
and large, we knew what we were doing! 
 
 Figure 2. Leon Van Speybroeck  (Chandra Telescope Scientist) and myself during a hold 9 
minutes 43 seconds before the first launch attempt. The third attempt on 1999 July 23 succeeded!  
 
Figure 3: From right to left: myself, Tom Aldcroft, Catherine Grant, Harvey Tananbaum, Roger 
Brissenden, Mark Bautz, Mark Freeman, Fred Baganoff, and Ken Gage at the Chandra Control 
Center, sharing the excitement of the official first-light observation in 1999 August. 
As noted above, this is neither the place nor the time for me to write my version of Chandra’s 
history and accomplishments, if for no other reason than that the Observatory—originally 
designed with a formal lifetime requirement of 3 years and a goal of 5—is still obtaining 
outstanding scientific results. Indeed, at this writing (2013 March 5), the most famous supernova 
remnant, the Crab Nebula, is flaring in -rays: Chandra will be pointed at the Crab this evening, 
participating in the important hunt for the specific location within the Nebula of the -rays flares. 
The Future 
I want to conclude this brief narrative with some comments and personal insights for the future 
of X-ray astronomy. First, I am (and many of my colleagues are) very concerned over the ever 
shrinking number of organizations (especially academic) that are currently directly involved in 
building scientific hardware. If the current trend continues, there may eventually be only one US 
institution with the infrastructure and resources to accomplish such tasks: That institution will 
most likely be at one of the NASA centers. Having fewer and fewer institutions responsible for 
technology development is not only worrisome, but potentially wasteful. Indeed, I see it as a 
hindrance to efficient progress. The concise and oversimplified reasons are (1) that no one has all 
the answers and (2) that competition breeds innovation.  
How have we gotten into this situation? There are many answers and I would not presume to be 
able accurately to cite them all. One major factor is that we have moved X-ray astronomy into 
the observatory era: Chandra is a prime (and highly successful) example. Chandra has spawned 
the growth of a large general-observer community. These observers are vital to the discipline, not 
only for their scientific acumen, but also because they comprise a large (and vocal) advocacy 
community. Without their widespread support, it becomes harder to raise money etc.  At the 
same time, however, these great observatories have taken decades to build and cannot adequately 
serve as training grounds and development programs for optics and instrumentation that will 
meet the future needs of the discipline.   
I believe that we pay another, more dreadful price, for the lack of young active experimentalists. 
As our scientific requirements grow in scope, projected costs are no longer based upon 
accomplishments or even partial accomplishments. We must predict years, even decades, in 
advance how much a new mission will cost. As the technology hasn’t been demonstrated 
(perhaps not even conceived), the cost estimates become outrageously high. This of course 
delays missions, often leading to programmatic rather than science-driven technical decisions 
because one is trying to cost to a schedule that is totally unrealistic. We, as a community, must 
shoulder much of the blame. We cannot seem to stand fast in supporting a more rational 
approach for developing missions. Even in those cases where future requirements are (somewhat 
oversimplifying) crystal clear (at least to me) and currently unobtainable, the Chandra example is 
an excellent one to follow. Thus, to be able to detect fluxes from galaxies at the dawn of the 
early universe will require sub-arcsecond optics of collecting power easily a factor of 10 or more 
larger that Chandra. Thus, we already know what we want to, even must, do to advance the field.  
To me this situation is analogous to the situation at the conception of Chandra. The telescope 
then was beyond the current state of the art and competing technologies were investigated both 
by the NASA Project and its research partner at SAO, but also with industry. We had not the 
chutzpah to put forth seriously the mission for consideration until we had built and X-ray tested 
an X-ray optic that met all of the detailed Chandra requirements. (This latter resulted in part 
because NASA and Congress insisted!) How successful was this approach? The cost overrun at 
launch was less than a few percent and the final cost was, accounting for inflation, the same as 
had been estimated by the Project and provided as input to the National Academy of Sciences 
Decadal Survey for Astronomy and Astrophysics for the 1980’s—i.e. nearly 20 years before it 
was built and launched! Once again, I maintain that one of the principal reasons for this success 
was the heavy involvement of experimental X-ray astronomers in all phases of the program. The 
question then becomes, where are these experimentalists to come from now?  
Of course, the answer to this question is to expand technical research primarily in the arena of X-
ray optics and to enlarge the balloon and sounding-rocket program. This is nothing new: Indeed, 
Decadal Surveys and advisory committees have been advocating these ideas for years. However, 
the missing ingredient is money. I am not so naïve to suppose that NASA can significantly 
expand the balloon and sounding-rocket programs through an increase to any current NASA 
budget. The budgetary trend, if anything, is in the opposite direction. My suggestion is to set 
aside a non-trivial amount $25M-$40M per year from the Explorer budget to add to the existing 
funds already budgeted for these methods of providing rapid access to space. I realize that there 
may be legal difficulties associated with the Congressional language for the Explorer program, 
but I am confident that, if this is what the community demands, it can happen.  
